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Abstract
There is a danger that the CDM will fail to live up to its goals, namely reduction 
of greenhouse gas emissions and enhanced sustainable development. Sustainabil-
ity labelling is a promising strategy to hedge against such failures. Labels could 
also serve as a business risk-hedging tool. The existing labels for the CDM are not 
comprehensive enough, however. A two-tiered stakeholder participatory approach 
with national flexibility under an international umbrella could be a promising op-
tion. Due to the necessary bureaucracy this might not be feasible. Labels in the 
spirit of the existing approaches – addressing only restricted aspects of sustainabil-
ity or not applicable to all sectors may be a second best option. Other instruments 
for the further regulation of the CDM, such as a profit tax, should therefore be dis-
cussed as well. 
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1 Introduction
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) allows the so-called Annex-I coun-
tries facing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions caps under the Kyoto Protocol (KP) 
to achieve emission reductions in countries not subjected to emissions caps.2 Gov-
ernmental and private entities can invest in such activities to produce “certified 
emission reductions” (CER) that directly account for domestic reduction goals in 
Annex-I countries or that can be sold on the carbon market. Investment in the 
CDM is a business activity and subject to corresponding risks such as volatile 
prices (i.e. of the CERs). Besides business risks, the CDM leads to a range of sus-
tainability risks, for example, to only achieve uncertain emission reductions or to 
result in a sell-out of cheap reduction possibilities without further gains for the 
host countries (Rose et al. 1999; Ott, Sachs 2002; see Molisa and Wittneben in this 
publication for a general discussion of the sustainability-business trade-off in the 
CDM in a societal context and Müller-Pelzer for a somewhat more project-related 
discussion).
To tackle the business risks, classical risk hedging mechanisms such as portfo-
lio approaches can be applied. In addition, it can be expected that the carbon mar-
ket itself will offer a wide range of products already common in financial markets 
(Nolles 2004). As the metric in the market is monetary, however, sustainability is 
not likely to be of decisive importance in such considerations.  
The sustainability risks can be framed as external costs of the CDM and intern-
alization of those would be the socially optimal strategy. Internalization could, for 
example, be achieved by a tax on CDM projects. Given the potential for consider-
able rents in CDM projects, taxing by rent sharing mechanisms is a promising sug-
gestion (Denne 2000, Muller 2007). Tax proposals, however, usually face consid-
erable opposition and an implementation in the CDM might not be politically vi-
able on a global level. China, as a first nation, however imposes a tax on certain 
CDM projects with expectedly low sustainability benefits, resp. high profitability 
(CDM China 2005, Point Carbon 2005).  
Currently, the sustainability risks – if tackled at all – are usually addressed by 
another, not market-based policy instrument, namely by standards or labels. There 
are different institutions (mainly NGOs and governmental agencies, but also some 
of the Carbon Funds; cf. Sutter 2003, CDCF 2005) providing sets of sustainability 
indicators to assess, and labels to communicate certain standards to be achieved by 
the CDM. This is mainly done on a voluntarily basis, but some funds or countries 
request all CDM projects they fund or host to comply with the standards they set. 
The UNEP has also issued a series of “Environmental Due Diligence” documents 
for risk assessment in several renewable energy techniques (UNEP 2003). 
Such labels or standards can also act as instruments to hedge against business 
risks as they could be combined with assured minimal CER prices, for example. 
They can also build on a certain segment of customers that are likely to buy CERs 
2  Annex-I countries are basically developed countries and economies in transition, and the 
Non-Annex-I countries are primarily developing countries.
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standing for reliably verified emission reductions. Even if CERs from unsustain-
able projects dominate the market and even if  there are no stringent reduction 
plans for the post-Kyoto phase, such labels and standards could be a way forward 
on a voluntary basis.
Sustainability labelling is thus an approach that could address both business and 
sustainability risks and that would break with the monetary focus of other business 
risks hedging strategies. In this paper, I assess the potential of labelling for the 
CDM. With current labels for the CDM, some shortcomings can be identified and 
one goal of this paper is to identify critical issues in CDM labelling and to suggest 
more optimal labelling strategies.
The CDM is one of the so-called flexibility mechanisms of the KP, broadening 
the supply side of CERs for the carbon market. As such it is a crucial part of the 
global carbon policy instruments designed in the KP. Labels perform well as a 
voluntary  consumer  information  instrument,  as  experience  from  other  sectors 
shows, where there are increasing market shares of sustainability labelled products 
(e.g. Wüstenhagen 1998, Bird et al. 2002). The greatest challenge for voluntary la-
bels is how to gain large market penetration. This is one of the important market-
ing issues for sustainability labels for goods such as food (organic) or electricity 
(green power) (Wüstenhagen 1998).
Going one step further, labels for the CDM can be considered from a global 
policy instruments perspective, i.e. regarding their potential to increase the sus-
tainability of the CDM in general by requiring all projects to comply with some 
additional standards. There are, however, theoretical results indicating that such 
mandatory standards are less efficient than other instruments such as guaranteed 
higher CER prices for sustainable projects (Fischer, Newell 2004). Interesting is 
also the theoretical economic literature on labels (relevant key concepts are “green 
products” or “impure public goods”, and “warm glow” as one explanation to buy 
such) and whether they have positive or negative environmental (or general wel-
fare) effects. Results usually depend on modelling details. Effects are not always 
positive and a detailed analysis of the concrete situation at hand is necessary (see 
e.g. Kotchen (2005, 2006) or Althammer, Dröge (2006)). An additional complica-
tion comes from the importance of any foreign direct investment (FDI) for many 
developing countries. Mandatory high standards could hinder some FDI projects 
that might not be very sustainable or that would not achieve true emissions reduc-
tions but that definitely would be advantageous from a standard economic devel-
opment perspective.   
The organisation of this chapter is as follows. Section 2 presents the CDM with 
a particular focus on its risks. Section 3 discusses sustainability indicators and la-
belling on a more general and abstract level. Section 4 brings these lines together 
and addresses labelling for the CDM, pointing out potential pitfalls and options for 
improvement. Section 5 concludes.
2 The  Clean  Development  Mechanism
The CDM is expected to lower compliance costs under the KP as the marginal 
GHG reduction costs are lower in developing countries. To qualify for the CDM, a 
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project has to reduce emissions below a baseline representing business as usual. 
Following the current understanding, this basically means that the project has to 
be profitable only with the additional revenues from CER sales (UNFCCC 2004). 
Setting this baseline is  a  crucial,  complex and controversial  task (Sutter  2003, 
Müller-Pelzer 2004), but once settled, the GHG reduction aspect of the CDM pro-
ject is well-defined. Besides this, it is an explicit goal of the CDM to foster sus-
tainable development in the host countries (UNFCCC 1997). There is clearly a big 
potential for sustainable CDM project activities (in rural energy supply or waste 
management, for example; see also Pal and Sethi in this publication), but the sus-
tainability goal lacks further concretization in the legal documents and gives con-
siderable leeway in interpretation. 
Partners in a CDM project are a public or private CER buyer, an institution in 
the host country and often also a consultant facilitating the transactions between 
buyers and host country institutions. Currently, many projects seem not to involve 
direct  investment  from Annex-I  partners  but  rather  CER purchase  agreements 
only, thus disproportionally shifting the risk to Non-Annex-I parties (Sutter 2005). 
Since February 2005, unilateral CDM projects are possible, i.e. an institution in a 
developing country can submit a project for registration under the CDM without 
involvement of other parties (UNFCCC 2005a). The CERs can then be sold on the 
market. 
The CDM sector grows rapidly (Fenhann 2006, 2007). I attempt a short sum-
mary of the current (May 2007) situation, although changes are fast and the situ-
ation will probably look different within some months. On the other hand, some 
trends or characteristics have now been stable for more than a year and thus may 
continue. As of May 2007, there are 645 CDM projects registered, 1221 are under 
examination and 19 withdrawn or rejected. In accumulated (till 2012) CER pro-
duction,  38%  are  Hydrofluorocarbons  (HFC)  destruction  (26%)  or  N2O 
capture/destruction (12%) projects that are likely to not deliver any additional sus-
tainability benefits (Schwank 2004, Cosbey et al. 2005). These percentages have 
been rather stable up to January 2006, although the number of projects and accu-
mulated  CER production  has  almost  doubled  between  October  2005 and  then 
(mid-January:  HFC  40%,  N2O  11%).  The  percentage  for  HFC  has  however 
dropped since then and criticism of HFC projects intensifies (ENB 2006, Point-
Carbon 2007). Landfill gas (Methane reduction) projects account for 9% of accu-
mulated CER production. They are likely to deliver sustainability benefits if com-
bined with energy use, but there are some large projects that only flare the gas, 
thus foregoing these additional avails. The accumulated volume of CERs from the 
1866 projects is about 1910 mill  tCO2e by 2012. The number of countries hosting 
CDM is steadily increasing but is still characterised by a skewed distribution: In-
dia (33%), China (24%), Brazil (12%) and Mexico (8%) have a share of more then 
3% in project number. The inequality in distribution decreases, however (in Janu-
ary 2006: India and Brazil accounted for 60% of the projects). Regarding CER 
generation, the distribution is even more skewed: China accounts for 49%, India 
for 17%, Brazil for 8%, and besides those, only South Korea (5.3%) reaches over 
3%. 2.2% of the projects are located in Africa, mostly in South Africa (17), Egypt 
(7) and Morocco (5), a share that declined since mid-January 2006 (2.6%). The 
biggest buyers currently are the UK with 376, The Netherlands and Japan with 
137  and  135  projects,  respectively,  whereas  for  979  projects  this  information 
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seems not available (i.e. it is likely that a CER purchase agreement has not yet 
been reached or that the projects are unilateral). 
The current experience with almost 38% of CER production not accompanied 
with increased sustainability and the unspecific formulation of this goal in the KP, 
as  well  as the questions regarding additionality,  emphasize the danger that  the 
CDM fails to live up to its goals. One specific aspect is that the CDM may lead to 
the sell-out of cheap reduction possibilities in developing countries what would 
leave them with the more expensive ones only in the future, when they may face 
caps themselves. This could be offset by technology transfer or learning effects 
that would keep marginal abatement costs down (Rose et al. 1999). At least part of 
the experience, however, indicates that such actions might not take place (as ob-
served  in  South  Africa,  for  example,  according  to  Steve  Thorne  in  UNFCCC 
(2005b)). These reservations towards sustainability performance of the CDM initi-
ated the discussion on sustainability indicators or labels for the CDM. First, to es-
tablish indicators for measurement of the sustainability performance and develop-
ment of CDM projects. And second to identify levels of good performance and to 
define standards and labels for this (e.g. Sutter 2003, Goldstandard 2005). The 
COP11/MOP1  in  December  2005  reached  decisions  for  improvement  of  the 
CDM, but no decisions have been taken to strengthen the sustainability goal or to 
address the lack of projects in least developed countries (Wittneben et al. 2006). 
This situation still prevails after the COP12/MOP2 in November 2006, where the 
skewed regional distribution was still an issue of primary importance (ENB 2006, 
UNFCCC 2006). Besides this, prime topics identified for 2007 were the role of 
several specific and partly new project types for the CDM (Carbon Capture and 
Storage, Afforestation/Reforestation, switching from non-renewable to renewable 
biomass), the ongoing discussion on additionality and the discussion on how to 
deal with HFC projects under the CDM.
Besides being an instrument of climate policy, the CDM sets the frame for new 
business opportunities. It is potentially profitable to invest in GHG reduction pro-
jects  in  developing countries and to sell  the CERs on the carbon market.  The 
mechanism also opens up opportunities for additional profit in ordinary invest-
ments due to the CERs produced. This can, for example, be the case for renewable 
energy projects. The opportunities of the CDM come with several risks, though. 
First, there is the uncertainty of the prices of CERs. This is mainly due to yet un-
clear details on rules and allocation plans for the first commitment period of the 
Kyoto Protocol (2008-12) to succeed the “trial period” of the European Emissions 
Trading System (EU-ETS) now under operation (2005-07). The general political 
and institutional uncertainty regarding the KP or any successor agreement after 
2012  further  adds  to  this  uncertain  business  environment.  However,  the 
COP11/MOP1 in Montreal, December 2005, decided formally to take up discus-
sions  on  regimes  beyond  2012  and  initiated  several  processes  in  this  context 
(Wittneben et al. 2006). This discussion was continued at the COP12/MOP2 in 
Nairobi, November 2006. Concrete decisions have not yet been reached, but the 
importance to fast proceed towards such is widely acknowledged  (ENB 2006). In 
any case, the EU-ETS is likely to proceed and it can be expected that in particular 
some NGO initiatives will be willing to buy CERs also outside a stringent post-
Kyoto agreement (such as the NGO “MyClimate” investing in projects to offset 
carbon emissions from air travel). The total market volume of CERs, however, is 
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heavily dependent on global participation. On this level, the role and volume of 
“hot air” credits in the market will also be decisive for CER prices. 
Specific  CDM risks are the possibility that  a project  is  not  accepted by the 
CDM Executive Board, the institution in charge of the whole CDM registration 
process. This bears the danger of sunk costs, especially for small projects, as trans-
action costs to file in a CDM project are still considered to be high. This problem 
and the insufficient funding of the CDM Executive Board have been addressed at 
the COP11/MOP1 in December 2005 (Wittneben et al. 2006). Additional funding 
has been decided on to overcome the bottleneck in processing of project proposals 
and some “sectoral” CDM will be possible, allowing for certain CDM activities 
bundling several project at different sites. Problems with monitoring and verifica-
tion of the CERs might occur and there is some potential that political opposition 
against specific CDM projects will arise. There is also the danger that a project 
does not deliver as many reductions as it claimed regarding the specific base-line 
chosen. Still changing or newly implemented national policies regarding revenue 
sharing also affect the profitability of projects. CER revenue shares are explicitly a 
matter of negotiation between the partners for each project (UNFCCC 2005c), but 
it is the prerogative of national governments to set additional rules, such as China 
did in 2005 by imposing a tax on CDM projects (CDM China 2005, Point Carbon 
2005: e.g. 65% of CER revenues for HFC projects, 30% for N2O).
Due account has also to be paid to the peculiar characteristics of CERs: they are 
no physical necessity for any firm, but the political decision to cap GHG emis-
sions make them a valuable input for any process emitting GHGs. The demand for 
CERs is thus generated politically and the good itself as well as the market are ba-
sically designed in a political process. Neither buyers nor sellers are interested in 
the quality of CERs (for example measured by the reliability of the reductions 
achieved or  by assured sustainability  effects).  The quality-based self-enforcing 
control  mechanism present  in  usual  goods  markets  is  thus  missing   (Repetto 
2001). 
3 Sustainability  Indicators  and  Labelling  
Sustainability indicators are built to capture the state and development of a system 
regarding  sustainability.  A  main  problem is  the  overly  general  quality  of  the 
concept “sustainability” that hinders it to be operational without further specifica-
tion. Any set of sustainability indicators frames some aspects on a concrete and 
measurable or evaluable level. It thus allows for a more or less complete descrip-
tion of a system regarding its sustainability in current state and in evolution. Sus-
tainability is most often framed by discerning economic, environmental and social 
aspects on equal footing, a structure many indicator systems follow. This makes 
the implicit trade-offs in any sustainability assessment explicit. Another common 
approach is more hierarchical, seeing the social aspects as final goals, the environ-
ment as an indispensable basis and the economic issues as efficient means to reach 
the goals given the boundary conditions accruing to the physical basis. The im-
portance of long-term time horizons and inter-generational equity further increase 
the complexity of the concept. 
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Sustainability indicators have become common after the UN Conference on En-
vironment and Development 1992 – the “Earth Summit”. With the “Agenda 21”, a 
program of action for sustainable development was launched and countries were 
asked to develop national strategies for sustainable development. This boosted a 
wide range of initiatives to make sustainability a topic in various contexts, such as 
for  local  authorities  (local  Agenda 21),  in  investment (sustainability  funds),  in 
firms (ISO 14000), energy production (environmental fiscal reform), to name just 
a few. In parallel, indicator systems to assess the sustainability of the effects of 
such activities were developed. 
The current situation regarding the application of sustainability is characterized 
by a lack of coordination and implementation of strategic action in national con-
texts (Swanson et al. 2004). While measuring indicators for the classical spheres 
economics,  environment and society is  widespread and rather  well  understood, 
this is not the case for more integrated aspects of sustainability. The aggregation 
of several indicators and the balance between generality/comparability and case 
specific adequacy also remains a challenge.  Implementation of strategic actions 
addressing integrated issues of sustainability and coordination between national 
and local strategies, and between sustainability policies and the general national 
budgeting process is lacking. Furthermore, there is a still largely unused potential 
to  implement  classical  economic policy instruments  such as the environmental 
fiscal reform (Swanson et al. 2004). 
While indicators measure state and development on a descriptive level, labels 
can be  used prescriptively.  They predominantly  apply  to  single  products,  pro-
cesses or producers. To specify what sustainability ideally means on such a con-
crete level is notoriously difficult. Basically two pragmatic strategies to deal with 
this  problem can  be  discerned.  Either  one  defines  a  limited  set  of  ideals  that 
should be achieved (e.g. recycling quotas), accepting the only partial view adop-
ted. Or one identifies some crucial negative aspects to be avoided (e.g. pesticide 
use), thus aiming at achieving a certain minimal standard. Furthermore it is useful 
to discern between broad sustainability labels like the EU eco-label and more re-
stricted  but  correspondingly more  detailed sector-specific  labels  such  as  green 
electricity (de Boer 2003). The main goal of labels is to provide simple, clear and 
reliable  information on aspects  of  the  goods  purchased  that  consumers  cannot 
verify. Labelling as a means of general and environmental information provision 
to the customer is not new (the “Blaue Engel” – blue angel –  in Germany, for ex-
ample, was established in 1977), but environmental labelling was boosted in the 
wake of Agenda 21, and social labelling became wide spread at the same time. 
The  aggregation  challenge  is  particularly  important  as  labelling  usually  in-
volves integrating a range of different indicators in a single measure. This is one 
point of criticism towards the EU eco-labelling scheme, and there is the danger 
that it undermines credibility (Karl, Orwat 1999). The problem is somewhat alle-
viated for the many labels that are specific for certain sectors and certain aspects 
of sustainability only, such as labels focusing on organic farming practices (“Or-
ganic”, “Bio”), fair-trade aspects (“Max-Havelaar”), or key environmental and so-
cial aspects in forestry and fisheries (“Marine” and “Forest Stewardship Council” 
- MSC resp. FSC). 
Current  labelling  schemes  involve  basically  four  groups  of  actors  (de  Boer 
2003). Producers are interested in labelling as it can give them a competitive ad-
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vantage – working somewhat like a brand – the market can be segmented accord-
ing to the new qualities the label stands for. It signals compliance with certain sus-
tainability standards and thus directly addresses a certain consumer segment. Con-
sumers gain access to information they did not have before or which to collect 
would be prohibitively costly. Governmental institutions see it as a potential to 
combat free riding by reducing the asymmetric information prevailing in any pro-
ducer-consumer relationship.  In addition, labels are one instrument that can be 
employed to achieve governmental sustainability goals. Other parties like NGOs 
have mainly a type of lobbying interest as labels can support their case. This ap-
plies for example to the process of newly defining a label, to start a discussion in 
this context and to work towards some regulation.
The recent development of labelling shows the genesis of a new type of labels 
that are no longer linked to any increase in individual material benefit (as it is the 
case for organic food, for example, that is free of pesticide residuals). “Green” 
electricity (i.e. non-fossil, non-nuclear and no large hydro) is the paramount ex-
ample. Labelling of “conflict-free” diamonds under the Kimberley-Process or the 
discussions on “fair-trade” oil are others. For all these products, there is no physic-
al difference between the labelled and the conventional. The direct consumer gain 
is thus not tangible but wholly ideational. However, indirect differences with a 
public good/bad character likely arise, e.g. through the negative effects of destabil-
izations due to environmental conflicts in the origin countries of many natural re-
sources (Mason, Muller 2007). 
Marketing is a crucial aspect for labelling schemes, especially for goods with 
only non-tangible ideational individual benefits. Bird et al. (2002) identify con-
sumer information and aggressive marketing as a crucial factor in increasing mar-
ket shares for green electricity. The presence of reliable labels and differentiated 
products, also offered in the low-price segment, are decisive as well. But there 
seems a considerable willingness to pay for labelled products, e.g. in energy-effi-
ciency,  which  also  exceeds the  expected  cost  savings  over  the  lifetime of  the 
product (Sammer and Wüstenhagen 2006). New aspects of sustainability market-
ing are the relevance of non-product-specific issues like social and environmental 
problems and how they intersect with consumer wants and demand. The potential 
and importance to affect macro conditions for the (new) markets on the policy 
level is also a new aspect because these conditions are seen as externally given in 
conventional marketing (Belz 2005). Sustainability marketing has also a longer 
time-horizon than conventional marketing and puts less emphasis on the sales and 
transactions than on a lasting relationship with the customer. 
4 Sustainability  Labels  for  the  CDM
Section 4.1 shortly presents some of the existing indicator and labelling schemes 
for the CDM. In many aspects, labels for CDM take labelling to its limits – the re-
lated problems but also the potential are outlined in section 4.2. Based on this, sec-
tion 4.3. investigates how an ideal label for the CDM could look like. 
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4.1  Existing  Sustainability  Labels  and  Indicators  for  the  CDM
Various indicator systems and labels for the CDM exist, provided by NGOs (e.g. 
the SSN sustainable development tool, the Gold Standard, the CCB standards), by 
governmental institutions (SUSAC, an EU institution to support CDM projects in 
African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries), and also by the carbon funds them-
selves (e.g. the Prototype Carbon Fund PCF) (Sutter 2003). Common to all these 
approaches  is  a  set  of  criteria  and  often some (explicit  or  implicit)  weighting 
scheme to make them comparable and to aggregate them to a one-dimensional 
measure allowing ranking and labelling of projects. Alternatively, or in addition, 
there are often minimal performance requirements for each criterion that have to 
be fulfilled by a project to qualify for the label.
Sutter (2003) identifies four key properties that should be fulfilled by any sus-
tainability assessment tool for the CDM: adjustability regarding (the various stake-
holders') preferences, possibility for relative measurements in the context of the 
sustainability of the larger surrounding system (e.g. the host country), reproducib-
ility of results, and an assessment that is as comprehensive as possible. His multi 
attribute utility theory (MAUT) based approach provides a framework to assess 
CDM projects fulfilling all these criteria. It is implemented by the government of 
Uruguay to assess all CDM projects it may host (Heuberger, Sutter 2003). A re-
cent assessment of all registered CDM projects as of autumn 2005 with a simpli-
fied version of this tool shows that none of the projects fulfill both the additional-
ity and the sustainability requirements (Sutter, Parreno 2005).
Currently one of the most prominent CDM labels is the Gold Standard (Gold-
standard 2005). For the first time, CERs have been issued for a Gold Standard cer-
tified project in march 2007 and more projects are in the pipeline (Goldstandard 
2005,  2007).  It  mainly  consists  of  a  sustainability  assessment  based  on  three 
groups of  3  to  5 indicators.  The projects  are  assigned a performance measure 
between -2 (major negative impacts) and +2 (major positive impacts) for each in-
dicator. Within each sub-group, the sum of the indicator values has to be non-neg-
ative and the over-all sum over the sub-groups has to be positive. No indicator 
must score -2. The indicators in sub-group one are 1) water quality, 2) air quality, 
3)  other  pollutants,  4)  soil  quality  and  5)  biodiversity  effects,  6)  employment 
(qualitative aspects); in sub-group two 7) livelihood of the poor, 8) access to en-
ergy services and 9) human and institutional capacity; in sub-group three 10) em-
ployment (numbers), 11) balance of payments and 12) technological self-reliance. 
As a second main point, the Gold Standard requires two main public consultations 
in the design phase in addition to the ordinary CDM stakeholder participation cri-
teria. One at the beginning and another, more comprehensive one, before the pro-
ject is validated. The Gold Standard states several rules for these consultations, 
such as information and publication requirements and at least one meeting to be 
held in the local languages. The third main point of the Gold Standard is conform-
ity against the host countries' or the CDM Executive Boards requirements regard-
ing an environmental impact analysis (EIA). If no such requirements are given for 
the project type, the project has to be checked against the requirements of the Gold 
Standard. The Standard requires an EIA if the first stakeholder consultation (cf. 
above) identifies significant environmental impacts.    
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Another  recently  developed  set  of  standards  are  the  CCB  standards  (CCB 
2005). They have four groups of criteria (general, climate related, community re-
lated, biodiversity) with 6 indicators for the first and 3 each for the others. Fulfill-
ment of these 15 criteria leads to accordance with the CCB standards. Each group 
provides two additional voluntary criteria, the fulfillment of which leads to a more 
stringent “silver” resp.  “gold”  label.  Regarding sustainability,  these criteria  re-
main, however, considerably general (mainly assessment of off-site negative im-
pacts) and part of them refer more to ordinary good business practices than to par-
ticular sustainability requirements. Indeed, this applies to all general criteria be-
sides the requirement of no significant land tenure disputes. These other general 
criteria refer to legality, management capacity, information on the base-line, ori-
ginal situation and goals of the project.
4.2  Problems  and  Potential  of  CDM  Labels
Labelling the CDM has several peculiar characteristics compared with common 
labelling schemes. It addresses not individual end consumers but rather govern-
mental institutions, funds and productive industries emitting GHGs. It is a label 
for an end product with only immaterial qualities and with demand generated by 
politics. It is topically very broad, in principle providing comprehensive sustainab-
ility labels to the whole range of different activities eligible under the CDM. The 
trade-offs intrinsic in the sustainability concept are thus transformed into similar 
trade-offs in the labels. Most existing labels claim general validity without differ-
entiation according to countries and their respective national sustainable develop-
ment plans. They thus face the classical problem of any sustainability label: the 
breakdown to project level of the ideal sustainable development that has to be seen 
in a wider geographical, cultural and temporal context. 
If Sutters four criteria are taken as a starting point, non of the existing labels 
fulfills all of those. His MAUT-approach does fulfill  them, but as it  is now, it 
defines rather an indicator set for assessment than a specific label. Yet it could 
easily be further developed into a basis for CDM standards or labels, for example 
by setting requirements such as that the aggregate utility has to be larger, or no cri-
terion must score less, than a certain value (cf. Heuberger and Sutter 2003). Due to 
the stakeholder participation, the MAUT approach is sensitive to case and poten-
tially also nation specific issues. It does, however, not automatically assure incor-
poration  of  long-term  aspects  and  coordination  with  national  sustainability 
strategies.
While CDM sustainability labels thus face some problems in reporting the sus-
tainability of CDM projects and working towards its increase in a comprehensive 
manner, they at least clearly capture a partial picture and can also work as risk 
hedging tools. This is so if a label succeeds in meeting consumers’ information de-
mands and can thereby establish credibility regarding the claims it makes. Sustain-
ability being often a too vague goal to strive for, a label can for example claim to 
stand for high quality reductions (in particular verified, reliably achieved reduc-
tions) or for other specific aspects of sustainability. Comparison with existing la-
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bels from other areas suggests that such restrictions make is easier to establish 
credibility. 
A particular potential for CDM labels exists in cases where sustainability risks 
and business risks coincide. This can be the case for projects involving smallhold-
ers,  for  example,  where  business  risk  hedging  aspects  like  guaranteed  output 
prices can also play a crucial role in hedging against risks threatening local liveli-
hoods. It is also the case for the above-mentioned high quality reductions, as they 
would lower the risk that the project actually generates fewer reductions than pro-
jected and thus leads to fewer revenues from CERs. 
In this context, marketing issues related to CDM labels may become more im-
portant. This aspect is crucial to classical labelling initiatives and the object of in-
creasing awareness in this field (cf. Belz 2005). It is largely neglected for CDM la-
bels so far. This might be partly because of the different type of actors involved 
and the absence of individuals as consumers. The incorporation of marketing as-
pects may also take some time because the CDM labels were initiated and de-
veloped by sustainability rather than by business risk concerns.
4.3  Options  to Improve  CDM  Labels
The discussion above suggests that an improved labelling approach for sustainable 
CDM should combine four key aspects:  1) a MAUT-based strategy with 2) clear 
labelling rules tied to the indicator values such as provided by the Gold Standard. 
It should also 3) include additional tools to assure coordination with national sus-
tainable development goals (assuming that those national strategies make sense) 
and – as a particular aspect thereof – 4) sensitivity to long-term aspects. 
Such an approach could be implemented employing a two-tiered instrument. 
Concrete specification for a MAUT-based procedure could be agreed on national 
levels, containing some further specifications for regions or sectors. An interna-
tional institution could then accredit the national strategies and provide labels that 
thus would be credibly applicable on a global level. This international institution 
might provide some guidelines to facilitate comparability of national strategies. It 
could also provide some minimal requirements on certain indicators that are glob-
ally felt to be a necessity for any sustainability label, e.g. on how to include long-
term aspects. Such a comprehensive approach, however, bears the danger to fur-
ther and disproportionately increase the administrative costs of CDM projects. 
Another strategy would be to abstain from any more comprehensive approach 
and to concentrate on some issues seen as particularly crucial for the situation at 
hand. The Gold Standard is such an example – but somewhat more flexibility re-
garding national situations and single cases could be advantageous. Instead of re-
stricting the indicators to be considered, a topically more specific approach could 
be taken, trying to establish labels for more narrow national or regional contexts or 
for more narrow sectors only – such as for hydropower schemes or waste manage-
ment. 
Such restricted labels would work as information provision tools for consumers 
and they could also be risk-hedging tools for producers. They are however less ad-
equate to assure sustainability of the CDM in a comprehensive manner. In particu-
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lar, if any national or international policy is to be based on sustainability perform-
ance of CDM projects according to some indicators, a comprehensive approach 
with stakeholder participation is likely to be indispensable. 
The peculiar properties of the good CER are important regarding marketing of 
labelled CERs. In particular because of the different characteristics of the buyers 
of CERs and the consumers of more conventional labelled goods. The influence 
on the wider economic context that is a topic in sustainability marketing in general 
is particularly important for the CDM, where rules for the mechanism itself are 
still  under  development.  This  changes  marketing strategies,  especially  towards 
governments that could make labels a legal issue thus settling the decision to buy 
once and for all. This is very different from individuals as consumers that are usu-
ally free to decide in favor or against sustainability labelled goods with each con-
sumption decision. 
It has to be kept in mind that the comprehensive labelling approach as sugges-
ted here is likely to further add to the bureaucracy involved in the CDM that is 
anyway plagued by high transaction costs. This is definitely an argument to em-
ploy more restricted labels. It could also be an argument to embark on a totally 
different strategy to further regulate the CDM such as a profit tax (Denne 2000, 
Muller  2007).  A  tax,  however,  usually  faces  more  opposition  from  lobbying 
groups  than  label-based  and  other  command-and-control  approaches  (Dijkstra 
1999). A tax could also be combined with some simple labelling scheme defining 
several tax levels according to a basic notion of sustainability performance. This 
would be in line with the general philosophy of the CDM and the KP as frame-
works for market-based approaches to reduce GHG emissions. An overly bureau-
cratized CDM is clearly not in this spirit.
5 Conclusions
Labelling the CDM takes labelling in general to a new level – both regarding the 
good labelled and the actors involved. In particular the types of consumers ad-
dressed are different compared to other labels, such as for organic food or green 
electricity. The labelling strategies identified for the CDM can thus give fruitful 
input to labels for other goods with similar types of target consumers such as nat-
ural resources not sold to individual consumers. In particular, stakeholder particip-
ation in framing and applying the labels and some [two-]tiered approach setting 
general guidelines on an international and more specific on a national level are 
new to labelling. Marketing aspects in this context are likely to play a crucial role 
– understood in a broad sense, including affecting the economic environment.
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